In May 2012 national parliaments of the EU issued their first yellow card under the Early Warning Mechanism of the Treaty of Lisbon. A sufficient number of them raised objections to a legislative proposal -the Monti II Regulation regarding the right to strike -that the Commission was required to review the proposal, which it subsequently withdrew. This outcome was, demonstrably, not a coincidence but the product of extensive interparliamentary coordination, enabled by the initiative of one determined parliament (Denmark's Folketing), a well-timed COSAC meeting, and the network of national parliament representatives in Brussels. A dynamic political process was set in motion in which a number of parliaments joined the effort to obtain a yellow card by, in effect, "voting against" Monti II before the eight-week deadline.
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I. Introduction: Harmless Procedure or Lever of Parliamentary Influence?
On the evening of 22 May, 2012, the Tweede Kamer, the lower house of the Netherlands parliament, adopted a "reasoned opinion" (RO) objecting to a legislative proposal of the European Union (EU). The proposal, known by the nickname Monti II, was controversial because it was widely seen as hurting the interests of EU workers by limiting their right to strike. National parliaments had been newly empowered, under the Early Warning Mechanism (EWM) established by the Treaty of Lisbon, to raise subsidiarity-based objections to EU legislative measures in the first eight weeks after they were proposed. The Tweede Kamer was the last national parliamentary chamber to voice its objections to Monti II before the eight-week period elapsed, doing so in the waning hours of the final day. In the end, twelve parliamentary chambers -seven unicameral parliaments, plus five single chambers from bicameral systems -passed ROs. This meant that under the rules of the EWM, the very first "yellow card" had been triggered. As a consequence, the institution which had proposed Monti II, the Commission, was required to review it, after which it had three options: it could maintain, amend, or withdraw the proposal. In September 2012, the Commission decided to withdraw it. Thus for the first time, national parliaments (NPs) had collectively intervened in the legislative process of the EU -to decisive effect. The occasion of the first yellow card -and the fact that it precipitated the withdrawal of the targeted legislation -challenges the commonly held view that the EWM is toothless. Around the time of its inception one scholar judged it to be a "rather harmless procedure, with only a marginal impact on the EU's legislative process" (Raunio 2010: 13) , and most academic observers who looked at the EWM took a similar view (Bellamy and Kröger 2012; De Wilde 2012; Fraga 2005; Kiiver 2006 ). Three kinds of mutually-reinforcing obstacles -logistical problems, incentive problems, and weaknesses inherent to the EWM -stood to prevent NPs from using the EWM to substantially affect EU legislation (Cooper 2012: 449-451) . It was widely doubted whether they had either the capacity (given the weakness of interparliamentary coordination) or the willingness (given the perceived apathy of a majority of NPs) to coordinate their efforts in order to gain sufficient support to achieve a yellow card, which -even if obtained -would not constitute a veto of the proposal. June 2013. Long interviews in Brussels (26-29 November 2012 , 3-7 June 2013 , as well as by telephone and email, were supplemented by short interviews on the margins of plenary COSAC meetings in Nicosia (14-16 October 2012) and Dublin (23-25 June 2013) . Two NPRs also shared their contemporaneous notes with the author. A number of officials read and gave comments on an earlier draft of this paper. In addition, five national MPs, including the Danish and Latvian European Affairs Committee (EAC) Chairs, answered questions on the record. The author warmly thanks all interviewees.
The finding that there was extensive coordination among national parliaments in the case of Monti II was also amply confirmed in the COSAC biannual report (COSAC 2013a: 26-34 ; for details, see the various answers to Question 4.8 in COSAC 2013b).
This article explains how these various obstacles were overcome in the case of the Monti II yellow card, by offering a detailed reconstruction of the events as they unfolded between March-May 2012. It is a dramatic story with unexpected twists and a nail-biting climax, the outcome of which was uncertain until the very end. Yet while it played out mostly in public view, it is still largely unknown to the public as it unfolded not in a single location but in parliaments and committee chambers scattered across the capitals of Europe. Even most of those who were directly involved -of which many were interviewed for this article -only know a part of the story and not the whole. This article enables a systematic reassessment of the effectiveness of the EWM in light of the experience of the first yellow card, and the scholarly literature which had mostly predicted that it would have little impact (see Section II). After a brief review of the Monti II proposal itself (Section III), a process-tracing analysis shows how NPs effectively used a number of tools of interparliamentary coordination (Section IV) that initiated a dynamic political process in which a number of NPs were influenced to pass ROs in the final days before the deadline (Section V). This outcome necessitates a scholarly reassessment of the EWM (Section VI) which, it is concluded, represents a new arena for democratic politics in the EU (Section VII).
II. A "Deviant Case" to Test the Effectiveness of the EWM
What does the story of Monti II contribute to the debate over whether the EWM enhances the influence of national parliaments in EU affairs? Of course, the mere fact that the yellow card happened does not disprove the sceptics, who only predicted that such an occurrence would likely be rare, and of little consequence even if it does occur (de Wilde 2012; Raunio 2010) . Indeed, the fact that only one 4 legislative proposal received a yellow card among the hundreds subject to review by NPs under the EWM in its first three years of operation (2010-2012) might reasonably be taken as evidence that the system has had little impact.
3 On the other hand, one might infer that the yellow card was not designed to be a routine occurrence but a kind of "alarm bell" triggered in unusual circumstances, and therefore even such a low number does not disprove the efficacy of the EWM (Cooper 2012 4 The EWM could also be effective in the absence of a yellow card, either by deterring the Commission from proposing subsidiarity-violating legislation in the first place (de Wilde 2012), or by giving NPs influence in the ensuing legislative process (Cooper 2013b) . However, neither of these circumstances is relevant in the case of
Monti II: the Commission was not deterred from proposing it, but also withdrew it before it entered the normal EU legislative process.
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card occurred it would be, "essentially… a coincidental sum of otherwise unrelated events" (Kiiver 2006: 164) to the actual text of the measure, which was seen as more damaging to workers' rights than had been expected (see Section III).
Sceptics made three kinds of arguments about the likely ineffectiveness of the EWM: first, NPs generally lack the logistical capacity needed to reach the yellow card threshold; second, they lack a strong incentive to work to obtain a yellow card;
and third, even if a yellow card were obtained this would not matter, as it would still not signify an increase in the influence of NPs on EU affairs. First, logistically, it is difficult for individual parliaments, deliberative institutions with already busy schedules, to properly vet large numbers of -often quite technical and complex -EU 6 legislative proposals and come to a decision regarding their subsidiarity compliance within an eight-week deadline. Moreover, interparliamentary cooperation is limited (Kiiver 2006; Raunio 2010: 7-9) , and provides few tools that would enable the coordination of a yellow card. As all parliaments are formal equals, they have no "leader" to rally opposition to a given measure. concern the nature of the subsidiarity review under the EWM (Cooper 2006; Fabbrini and Granat 2013; Goldoni 2014; Kiiver 2006 Kiiver , 2012 : is it political or legal-technical in nature, are NPs appropriate subsidiarity watchdogs, and is it legitimate for them to raise essentially political, rather than purely subsidiarity-based, objections to a proposal? Also beyond the scope of this article is the broader question of whether
NPs constitute a collective entity at the EU level, e.g. a "virtual third chamber" (Cooper 2012 ). However, as will be seen below, NPs did in some ways act like participants in such a chamber, insofar as they coordinated their efforts to gather a sufficient number of "votes" to reach the threshold for a yellow card.
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III. The Proposed Monti II Regulation
The Commission formally adopted the Monti II legislative proposal on 21
March 2012, but the EWM clock began ticking on 27 March, the day that it sent a lettre de saisine to NPs officially notifying them that, as the proposal had now been transmitted in all official languages, they could address a RO to the EU institutions within the subsequent eight-week period. Under the EWM, two "votes" are allotted Unusually, the legal basis of the proposal was the "flexibility clause" (Art. 352 TFEU) which empowers the EU to take action in a circumstance where it lacks a power specified by the Treaty. This meant that the proposal would require unanimous approval in the Council, as well as the approval of the EP. This was a "special"
(rather than the "ordinary") legislative procedure, which meant for NPs that it was subject to the yellow card but not the orange card under the EWM. In addition, many thought that it should be subject to heightened scrutiny as it meant that the EU would be exercising powers not specified in the treaty; in fact, post-Lisbon statutes in at least two member states (Germany and the UK) required that the approval of any EU measure based on the flexibility clause must be authorized by a prior act of parliament, or else the government is obliged to vote against it in the Council.
As required by the treaty, NPs objected to Monti II on the grounds that it violated the principle of subsidiarity, although these objections frequently overlapped with broader objections on policy grounds, or to its legal basis. The most common objections were: the legislation is unnecessary because existing national arrangements are sufficient to address the problem; the legislation has no value-added vis-à-vis the current legal status quo; EU intervention in this area might disturb well-functioning national arrangements; and the proposal does not achieve its objectives of clarifying the relationship between social rights and economic freedoms or reconciling them in practice in cross-border situations. While the opponents to Monti II within the NPs came from across the political spectrum, and many were motivated more by protecting national autonomy than workers' rights per se, there is on balance a leftward tilt to the campaign against it. Broadly, it was a yellow card for -that is to say, in defense of -the striker.
IV. Tools of Interparliamentary Coordination
Any effort to coordinate the various NPs of the EU to act in concert to achieve a yellow card is presented with a host of logistical problems. Each parliament tends to work slowly, according to its own timetable, and according to its own unique set of procedures. Ultimately, the decision to pass a RO is a matter for the discretion of each parliamentary chamber. Moreover, as all NPs within the EU are formal equals, and all actions by NPs in the EWM are voluntary, a yellow card must be the result of a spontaneous, self-organizing, bottom-up process. This said, NPs do have some tools of interparliamentary coordination at their disposal which proved useful in this case.
First of all, it is often the case that one parliamentary chamber will take on the role of "initiator" ("leader" is perhaps too strong a word, given that it lacks any power to coerce or reward), the first to move to adopt a reasoned opinion and then to encourage others to do so. In the case of Monti II, the initiator was the parliament of Denmark, which in turn (as we shall see) made use of the other tools of interparliamentary coordination to amplify its influence. Second, there are various interparliamentary meetings which provide important networking opportunities, such as COSAC, the twice-yearly gathering of EAC members from all EU parliaments (Knudsen and Carl 2008) . COSAC has often been derided as a mere talking shop -it has no independent decision-making power -but it does provide an opportunity for national parliamentarians to meet together on a face-to-face basis, which proved extremely valuable in this case. Third, there is the network of national parliament representatives (NPRs): almost all NPs have civil servants stationed in Brussels as permanent representatives (Christiansen et al. 2013) , and they played a crucial role in coordinating the response to Monti II. Finally, there is IPEX, an online platform for interparliamentary exchange (Knutelská 2013 The coordinating role of the NPRs was also crucial. In mid-2012 every NP, with the exception of Slovakia, had at least one staff representative to the EU institutions in Brussels. The NPRs all work in close proximity to one another, in a suite of offices provided courtesy of the EP. This group meets on a weekly basis at Monday Morning Meetings (MMMs), which are also attended by officers from IPEX and COSAC -but not from other EU institutions, unless they are invited for the occasion -to discuss internal issues, including matters of subsidiarity control in NPs.
They are also continuously in contact with one another through a common email list and can share documents privately on a common server. As envoys from the home Tweede Kamer passed a RO in plenary even though the sectoral committee failed to recommend one -which attests to the momentum that was building towards a yellow card. In addition, it is important to distinguish between the date on which each chamber made the political decision to adopt a RO, and the date of its formal adoption (see Table 1 ). For example, ROs were formally adopted by the UK House of
Commons and the French Sénat on 22 May, the final day, but the political decision had effectively been made much earlier, and these earlier decisions would have been known to other NPs and factored in to the running tally of EWM votes kept by the NPRs during the process. 15 15 Where committee and plenary were both involved, the day of the committee meeting is treated here as the date when the political decision to adopt a RO was made, in chambers where (a) the decision on Monti II was made by consensus, and/or [INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] When the timing and sequence of ROs is reconstructed (see Table 1 ) a distinct pattern emerges. Whereas those chambers that are among the most "prolific" participants in the EWM (having passed 9 or more ROs in the first three years) decided to adopt ROs relatively early in the eight-week review period for Monti II, those chambers which are among the most "reticent" (having passed 4 or fewer ROs in the first three years) adopted theirs relatively late. After Denmark passed its RO, five prolific chambers -the French Sénat, the Swedish Riksdag, the Polish Sejm, the
UK House of Commons and the Luxembourg Chambre des Députés -moved to adopt
ROs between late April and mid-May. (The exception is the Tweede Kamer which, for reasons discussed below, was the last chamber to adopt its RO.) In the French Sénat, the EAC unanimously adopted a draft RO quite early, on 25 April; after the sectoral committee took no decision on it, and no party group requested a plenary debate, the RO was deemed to be adopted on 22 May. In the Swedish Riksdag, the decision was made in the Labour Market Committee, which decided to draft a RO on 26 April, which it adopted unanimously on 3 May, and which was formally adopted in the plenary on 11 May. In the UK House of Commons, on 9 May the European Scrutiny Committee agreed a detailed report on the proposal, including a draft RO; this RO was eventually passed by the plenary on 22 May. In the Polish Sejm, on 27
April the EAC found the proposal incompatible with the principle of subsidiarity; the plenary adopted a RO to that effect on 11 May. The Luxembourg Chambre des (b) a committee decision whether or not to adopt an RO is rarely or never overturned by the plenary.
Députés passed a RO by consensus in its Committee on Labour and Employment on
14 May, and then through the plenary on 15 May.
Given that these five are among the handful of EU chambers that pass the most ROs, it is not altogether surprising that they passed them in the case of Monti II.
If only these six chambers -the Danish initiator and the five prolific chambers that followed -passed ROs, then there would have been just nine votes, half of those needed for a yellow card. What made it possible to reach the threshold of 18 votes was the late intervention of five reticent chambers -the parliaments of Finland, Portugal, Latvia, Malta, and the Belgian Chambre des Représentants -four of which made the political decision to pass a RO only in the final week before the deadline. It is the actions of these five reticent chambers, as well as the Tweede Kamer, which deserve closer attention here. These chambers took their decisions with the knowledge that a yellow card was within reach as the deadline was approaching.
The Finnish Eduskunta takes a particular view of its role in EU-related matters. Generally, the Eduskunta exercises strong and active scrutiny of the Finnish government's conduct of EU policy, but it takes a skeptical view of interparliamentary cooperation and political dialogue with the Commission, which it views mostly as a waste of time: moreover, it takes the view that in the EWM a RO should be addressed to subsidiarity as narrowly defined in the treaty, and not as an opportunity to comment on the substance of the proposal (Eduskunta 2013 critique of the proposal, saying that while it goes "in the right direction," it is problematic "in its current form" as it "limits the right to take collective action" (p.14). This provided ammunition for the EAC, which proposed a RO, which was adopted by the plenary on 18 May.
On that same day, four days prior to the deadline, the EAC of the Latvian Saeima -which had never before passed a RO -also decided that Monti II was in breach of subsidiarity, and passed a RO on behalf of the whole chamber. As 16 For a comparison of the Nordic parliaments' approaches to the EU, the EWM and On the morning of the final day, the vote tally stood at 17 certain or nearcertain votes, one vote short of a yellow card. At this point there was an unexpected intervention from the Belgian Chambre des Représentants. 17 This chamber has an unusual arrangement in which the relevant sectoral committee, rather than the EAC or the plenary, may pass a RO on behalf of the whole chamber. Prior to Monti II, only two ROs had been adopted by the Chambre des Représentants, and both of those came from a different sectoral committee than the one in this case. In the Committee on Social Affairs, the idea of passing a RO objecting to Monti II was first put forward 17 According to interviews, the action of the Belgian chamber came as a complete surprise to the other NPRs in Brussels. Ironically, they were better informed about events in Lisbon, Riga, and Valletta than about the plans for a last-minute RO being card. This RO was adopted by the committee at about 3 pm on 22 May, bringing the total number of votes in the EWM to 18, the threshold for a yellow card.
In the Tweede Kamer, the decision whether to recommend a RO on Monti II, which normally would have been taken in the relevant sectoral committee, was delayed by the fall of the government on 21 April. It was not until 15 May that the Social Affairs and Employment Committee finally met for a vote on Monti II, which failed to muster a majority in favour of a RO. While that normally would have put the issue to rest, it was revived when the necessary 30 votes were gathered to put the question on the agenda of the plenary, scheduled for 22 May. The debate took place in the evening, around 7:15 pm; the assembled members knew of the Belgian RO and that the vote total was very close to the yellow card threshold (the exact number was still uncertain, as not all ROs had been uploaded to the IPEX website). The Minister for Social Affairs and Employment was actually present in the chamber, voicing the government's opinion that a RO was unnecessary because Monti II would be more appropriately addressed later, when it comes up in the Council. Despite this, the parties of the right and left joined to vote in favour of a RO, so in the end the plenary vote was unanimous. This was the first time that the plenary had, in effect, overturned the subsidiarity decision of a committee. With just a few hours to spare, the last -as it turned out, the nineteenth -vote was cast in the EWM, and the yellow card was passed.
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VI. Revisiting the Previous Arguments About the EWM
We are now in a position to revisit the above arguments about the More importantly, the experience shows that NPs as a group have logistical tools with which to coordinate their efforts to achieve a yellow card. Early in the process, one chamber can act as an "initiator" by being the first to identify a proposal as problematic and pass a RO against it, thereby alerting other NPs and encouraging them to do the same. In the middle of the process, an interparliamentary meeting can facilitate an exchange of views on the substance of the proposal and spread awareness of the extent of opposition to it among NPs. And towards the end, the network of NPRs can provide NPs with timely information about the "vote count" that can influence their decision on whether to adopt a RO before the deadline. Certainly, all these elements came together to facilitate the Monti II yellow card, but that is not an entirely improbable confluence of events. First, it is not uncommon for one chamber or another to step forward as "initiator," leading opposition to a given legislative proposal. her own chamber but in other parliaments as well. 21 Her example challenges the assertion that, "As for policy influence, the ability of an individual legislator to influence politics at the European level is probably close to zero, including under the early-warning mechanism" (Raunio 2010:10) .
While most NPs seemed to lack interest in the EWM during the COSAC tests and in the early period after it was first launched, this is belied by the fact that their scrutiny activities, including the number of ROs produced, has increased steadily since its establishment. 22 The COSAC tests were a hypothetical exercise undertaken before the Treaty of Lisbon became law, about which Knutelská (2013: 47) Monti II would have required unanimity in the Council (see Section III), each government effectively had a veto over the legislation, and thus did not need the help of its parliament to block the proposal. While the policy preferences of government and parliament were almost always closely aligned -in opposition to Monti II -they did not always agree tactically on whether to use the EWM to advance those preferences. In three countries -Denmark, the UK, and the Netherlands -the government took the view that the proposal was problematic on substantive grounds but did not violate the principle of subsidiarity; indeed, in the Netherlands, the government minister continued to argue against a RO in the final debate in the Tweede Kamer before it was adopted. In at least two countries, Malta and Latvia, the government did not take a position on the legislation until the parliament asked for it; in these cases, the government effectively went along with the parliament's opinion.
The very earliness of the EWM requires parliaments to publicly give their opinion on a legislative measure, often before their respective governments have determined their position on the proposal.
Finally, sceptics argue that NPs have gained little or no influence because final decisions over EU legislation remain in the hands of the Commission, Council and EP. Indeed, the first yellow card, issued in May 2012, was merely advisory, only requiring that the Commission review Monti II, after which it could have amended it or maintained it unchanged. In the event, the Commission withdrew the proposal in September 2012, but in a manner that seemed to minimize the role of NPs, insisting that Monti II was in compliance with the principle of subsidiarity but was being withdrawn because it "…is unlikely to gather the necessary political support within the European Parliament and Council to enable its adoption." The latter point is certainly true. In the Council, it is very unlikely that Monti II would have gained the necessary unanimous approval, given that a number of national ministers of Employment and Social Affairs had expressed preliminary misgivings about the proposal as early as 25 April, when it was discussed informally in the relevant Council group (EPSCO). Moreover, in the EP, where majority approval would have been required, opposition spread to the point that in July a number of leaders of EP party groups took the very unusual step of writing to the Commission to insist that With the passage of the first yellow card, and the subsequent withdrawal of the targeted legislation, the NPs have shown themselves to be a collective force in EU politics. While they do not, as a group, have the power to veto an EU proposal, they can intervene in the EU legislative process in a way that gives them influence over the final outcome. In historical perspective, their common position is in some ways comparable to that of the EP in the 1980s -for example after the 1980 Isoglucose ruling, the upshot of which was that the other EU institutions could no longer simply ignore the EP's opinion on proposed EU legislation. 30 While the circumstances are not identical, the Monti II yellow card presents a similar historical moment, in that it represents the first time that NPs asserted themselves in the EU legislative process in a way that the EU institutions could not ignore. 30 In Isoglucose, the European Court of Justice ruled that the Council must await the opinion of the EP before adopting legislation under the "consultation" procedure. In fact, a closer (but less famous) historical analogue to the first yellow card was the Benzene Directive (1988), which was the first legislative proposal to fail partly due to the opposition of the EP which, under the "cooperation" procedure, had influence over legislation but not an outright veto (Corbett et al. 2011: 258-264) . On the analogy between the "cooperation" procedure and the EWM, see Cooper (2012: 448-449 ).
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The EWM was originally devised by the European Convention with a dual purpose, not only to introduce a new subsidiarity check on proposed legislation, but also to give NPs a greater say in the affairs of the EU in the hope that this would diminish the democratic deficit (Cooper 2006) . It would be premature to draw, from a single case, conclusions as to whether the latter goal is being achieved. Moreover, considering that only a minority of chambers passed ROs, the yellow card does not prove that NPs are a collective actor at the EU level. However, many NPs did at least act like participants in a "virtual third chamber" (Cooper 2012) in the following way:
they monitored and influenced one another as they decided how to cast their "votes" within a political procedure oriented towards reaching a voting threshold that, when reached, had legislative consequences. In conclusion, on the evidence of the first yellow card, the EWM is not primarily a legal or technical exercise. Rather, it is new arena for democratic politics in the EU.
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